






THORNTON M. PRATT, Iditor-in-ChteE
A. CUIECR BOYD, Business Manager.
ALEXANWDER ARMSTRONG, J3., WILLIAM C. MASON,
FRANKLIN S..EDMONDS, JOHN ADELBERT RIGGINS,
JOHN GLASS KAUFMAN, BOYD LEE SPAHR,
JOHN WILLIAM HALLAAN, HENRY WILSON STAHLNECKER,
WAIThR LOEWY, JOSEPH B-CK TYLER.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $3.o0 PER ANNUm. SINGr COPIES, 35 CEiTS."
Edited by members of the Department of Law of the University ofPennsylvania
-under the supervision of the Faculty, and published monthly for the Department by
A. CULVER BoYD, Business Manager, at S. W. Cor. Thirty-fourth and Cestnut Streets,
Philadelphia, Pa. Address all literary communications to the EInonr-Crem; all
nesscommunications to the BuSniEss MANAGER.
CONTRATS-DEFINITENESS Or TERMS IN A SPECIAL CON-
-TRACT.-DoYle v. Edmonds, 91 1. W. 322 (Supreme Court of
South Dakota, July, 1902). Assumpsit.
The facts are as follows: The plaintiff, Doyle, sues defend-
ant as administator of one Crisci on promise made by Crisci
that if Doyle as a physician would perform an operation on him,
he would pay for Doyle's services "from $200 to $400." In the
lower court Doyle obtained a verdict for $250.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota first decided that this
lromise by decedent and the performance of the act by plaintiff
constituted a definite special contract. They then held that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover only $200 as he failed to
prove that his services were worth more, under, a statute of
that jurisdiction which states that "where a contract does not
,determine the amount of the consideration . . . the con-
,sideration must be so much money as the object of the contract
-is reasonably worth.'
It is submitted (1) that the court erred in considering this
NOTES.
a definite special contract; (2) that even assuming for the sake
of argument that the contract was, as stated by the court, a
definite one, then the court erred in deciding the amount of
plaintiff's recovery under a statute which clearly is intended to
apply, not to special contracts, but to contracts implied in fact.
In such cases, where with mutual assent, work is done, or goods
taken, but without any definite price stipulated, on an implied
promise the promisee may recover what the labor or goods are
reasonably worth, and it is to such class of contracts implied
in fact that the South Dakota statute clearly refers. But the
court after deciding that this contract was a special one-and
therefore not an implied one-determined plaintiff's rights to
recovery as if no price had been set by the parties, i e., as if the
physician had performed his services on an implied promise to
pay him what they were reasonably worth. Now if that is all
that the court meant, then their rather labored efforts to prove
the contract a definite special one were quite unnecessary, for
if the contract comes rightfully under the statute, there is no
need to prove it perfectly definite. A contract implied in fact is
by its very nature often indefinite as to price. But the court
did hold, in an elaborate opinion, that the contract was definite.
By what right then could they say that plaintiff should .be
allowed to recover only what his services were reasonably worth,
in the teeth of a contract which called for "from $200 to $400,"
and which'the court had just declared was definite and binding.
Admitting that the physician might very well recover for
fair value of work done, it is submitted that the contract held
definite by the court, was void for uncertainty and indefinite-
ness of terms. To support its decision the court states that
alternative contracts have always been held definite and valid.
This is unquestionably true. McNibb v. Mlark, 7 Johns, 465,
1811; Choice v. Mosely, 1 Bailey, 136, 1828; Plowman v. Riddle,
7 Ala. 775, 1845; Thorn v. City Rice Mills, L. R. 40 Ch. Div.
357,. 1889; McMillan v. Philadelphia Company, 159 Pa. St.
142, 1893. All the authorities cited by the court, with one
exception, are cases ?f alternative contracts, but this was -not
an alternative contract. A promise to pay "from $200 to
$400" is a very different thing from a promise to pay $200 or
$400. The latter is alternative, the former is vague. Accord-
ing to the rules in alternative contracts, the promisor has his
option up to the time set, after which the option passes to the
promisee. Now if the court had any idea that this was an
alternative contract, they should have allowed the plaintiff as
promisee having option $400, instead of only giving him
$200! But this promise lacks the essential element of an
alternative agreement where there is to be done one thing or
another. Here the promise was to pay, not one sum or another
but any sum within certain limits.
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The remaining case cited .y the court is United Press v.
New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. R. 527, 1900, in
which it was held that an executory contract for news service to
extend over a period of years at a price "not exceeding three
hundred dollars during each and every week that said news
report is received" was so indefinite as to the price to be paid
as to preclude a recovery of damages for refusal to accept the
service. In that case Gray, J., says "It (i. e., the alleged spe-
cial contract)* lacked support in one of its .essential elements;
in the absence of a statement of the price to be paid. That was
a defect which was radical in its nature and which was beyond
the reach of oral evidence to supply; for if the intention of the
parties in so essential a particular cannot be ascertained from
the instruments (or from the terms of their special contract),*
neither the court, nor the jury, will be allowed to make an'agree-
ment for. them upon the subject." The Dakota court hold this
case rightly decided, but say it would be different if a minimum
price had been named.
This New York ease is supported, on similar facts, by two
Pennsylvania, decisions, Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. St. 426, 1864;
Peacock v. Cumm ngs, id. 434. But it is submitted that the
mere addition of a* minimum price is not sufficient to relieve
this contract of its uncertainty. The New York ease is void
not because its leaves one limit undefined, but because the
promise there was neither certain nor explicit. The same is
true here. The promise has a range of anywhere from $200 to
$400. Suppose the defendant had offered plaintiff $300, could
the plaintiff have refused it, on the ground that aefendant's
.offer was up to $400? Or if plaintiff demanded $400 of defend-
ant, could the latter refuse to pay, stating that his promise
started at $200, and that payment of $200 would satisfy the
terms? Clearly a contract susceptible of such wrangling is
not definite and clear.
It is elementary in the law that the full intention of the
parties must be ascertained with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. This may be ascertained though the contract's terms
are not minutely specific. For example a contract to supply
ice "for the season" is sufficiently definite. East v. Lake Ice
Line, 21 N. Y. Sup. 887, 1893. Likewige a promise to pay
interest on certain outstanding indebtedness, amount of which
may be known by reference to books, N. C. Ry. v. Walmouth,
193 Pa. St. 207, 1899. But in all such cases the terms are
easily determinable. If, however, the agreement is uncertain
and-vague in its terms it is unenforceable. As'a promise to
give one hundred acres of land, without designating what land,
Sherman v. Kitsmiller, 17 S. & R. 45, 1827; see also Soles v.
* Words in parentheses are the editor's.
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Hickman, 20 Pa. St. 180, 1853; Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa.
St. 475, 1859.
The mere fact that here a minimum price was stated does not
affect the principle that a contract indefinite in terms cannot
be enforced. Suppose no minimum had been named, it would
then be a promise to pay up to $400. From what up to $400?
Naturally from one dollar, or even from one cent. If this is
bad for uncertainty, the mere fact that $200 instead of one
cent is placed as the lowest figure, does not obviate the vague-
ness and uncertainty still allowed by the range between the
amounts stated.
Where a benefit is conferred by one party and accepted by the
other, as a matter of business, and so understood by both parties,
though no price is stated, or if stated is so vague as to be of no
avail, a recovery is allowed in assumpsit for the fair value of
the services performed, Kidder v. Boom Co., 24 Pa. St. 193,
1855. But this is upon the obligation implied in- fact and not
upon a special contract. It is upon such grounds here, and
such only, that the plaintiff should recover.
B.L.S.
